Network firewalls have played a crucial role in reducing unwanted traffic by blocking unsolicited incoming data. However, for many new environments, (such as in peer-to-peer networks and certain new scenarios where wireless terminals act as servers) not all unsolicited data can be blocked. In wireline networks, this problem can partially be solved by opening dedicated pinholes in the network firewalls to allow unsolicited packets to pass. In cellular and wireless networks, however, opening dedicated pinholes can lead to new forms of denial of service (DoS) attacks that are not seen in wireline networks. For example, an attacker can send undesired data through the pinhole and consume the costly radio resources for which the mobile user will have to pay. By flooding the victim with undesired traffic, the attacker can also drain the battery power of the mobile device. Therefore, in these cases, firewalls can neither simply block all unsolicited traffic nor simply open dedicated pinholes. In this paper, we describe a mechanism by which a firewall can allow unsolicited TCP traffic to reach a mobile device and yet protect the mobile from the DoS attacks described above. Our approach is transparent to the end hosts and does not require any modification to TCP. Finally, this scheme requires very minimal changes to existing firewalls.
INTRODUCTION
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is characterized by an explicit attempt to prevent a legitimate user from accessing a service [1] . A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack deploys multiple attacking entities (which may themselves be victims) to achieve this goal (see [2, 3] for a detailed description of DDoS attacks and defense mechanisms). In both these kinds of attacks, the attacker attempts to exhaust the limited resources of the victim by exploiting certain vulnerabilities in the way resources are allocated. For example, in the case of SYN flooding attacks [4] , the attacker exhausts the memory allocated for TCP connection by opening an excessive number of uncompleted connections. As described in the Cert Advisory Denial of Service Attack Trends [5] , the most popular means of launching a DoS attack is based on flooding the victim's network. A popular mechanism to defend against these flooding attacks is to deploy a firewall [6] that filters out unsolicited traffic before it can reach the victim node. For most applications that follow the clientserver model, firewalls have filled an important security gap.
While firewalls have worked well for client-server applications, they pose new challenges in the peer-to-peer communication model where the server itself can be behind the firewall (or, in those cases where the terminal acts as a server). For these situations, filtering out all unsolicited packets is not possible. To address this issue, network administrators typically configure firewalls to allow unsolicited packets (with well defined attributes) to traverse the firewall by opening dedicated pinholes. Typically, these pin-holes are based on port numbers, or port number ranges depending on the nature of the protocol that should bypass the firewalls. Although these dedicated pinholes work well in wireline networks, opening pinholes could result in new avenues for attacks in wireless networks. For example, mobile devices are easy target for battery exhaustion attacks. Because most wireless devices have limited battery power, wireless protocols are required to behave in ways that will minimize battery drain [7] 1 . In order to save battery power, most mobile devices enter a dormant state in the absence of any traffic. By flooding the wireless device with unsolicited traffic through the pinhole, an attacker can drain battery power even if the attacker cannot cause protocol level attacks. In addition, the air interface in certain cellular and wireless networks is an expensive resource and users are charged also for receiving traffic. A flooding attack on the cellular link will, therefore, result in high costs for the user, even if the mobile device ultimately discards the unwanted packets.
In this paper, we describe a way by which existing firewalls could be minimally modified to address the above-mentioned problems. While there are numerous more elegant and effective ways to address the problem, we were constrained by two important practical factors:
1. The solution should be easy to deploy on a need-byneed basis, and 2. The solution should not assume any assistance from routers or other nodes in the network.
Furthermore, we were only concerned with TCP traffic. The reasons for the focus on TCP traffic are that other approaches already exist to address threats over other transport layer protocols, such as UDP. For example, a Voiceover-IP application using RTP or SRTP data traffic can use SIP to establish the session and the SIP proxies can dynamically create the necessary pinholes for the data traffic through the use of MIDCOM [8] . As for other connectionoriented transport layer protocols, such as DCCP and SCTP, these protocols are not widely deployed yet and therefore, were not the primary motivation for this work (although the scheme described here could easily be extended to these protocols).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the problem to solve in further detail and provides a brief overview of the related work. Section 3 introduces the proposed solution. Section 4 discusses the implementations aspects of the protocol. Finally, Section 5 points out the limitations of the proposed work and investigates potential future directions.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND RELATED WORK
Most applications supported in cellular and enterprise networks are based on the client server communication model, where clients start their communication to servers in the external networks. Connections initiated by clients behind a firewall, go through the stateful inspection process of the firewall that allows or denies the connection to be established. When a connection is authorized to communicate outside the firewall's perimeter, the packet filtering engine creates state based on the source and destination IP address, the protocol type, the port numbers and other packet header information to allow subsequent incoming packets to pass through the firewall. Incoming packets for which there is no state are dropped. This allows a firewall to block unsolicited IP traffic while allowing legitimate traffic to pass. This has worked rather well until now, and most unsolicited traffic has been blocked at the network firewall.
However, many applications (such as peer-to-peer (P2P) applications) do not follow this client-server model. For these applications, wireless terminals take both roles, "clients" and "servers". For these applications to work well, global connectivity is a pre-requisite and the firewall must allow the incoming unsolicited message to reach the hosts so that the connection can be established. This can, however, lead to different types of attacks since incoming traffic may be malicious or unwanted traffic. In wireless networks, the effect and the degree of damage done using these attacks are typically different as outlined in the Section 1. These attacks include reduction of victim's battery lifetime, bandwidth consumption, and over-billing attacks.
A natural way to solve these problems is to have an inbuilt detection mechanism in the Internet architecture that could prevent all forms of DoS attacks. While schemes such as ingress filtering [9] , IP Traceback [10] and Pushback [11] could address our problem to a large extent, they are not widely deployed in the Internet and did not meet our requirements for easy deployment. Another possible solution was to have an Intrusion and Misuse Detection System (IDS) such as Snort [12] , Bro [13] , or DOMINO [14] in built into the firewall, and follow the open pinhole model of wired networks. While IDS will help in these cases, often the detection is ex post facto, which does not prevent over-billing attack. Furthermore, many IDS can be fooled in some cases by changing the attack traffic patterns [15] .
The Network Puzzles proposal [16] suggests to integrate puzzles at the network layer. This proposal does not require modifications to applications and therefore all higher layer protocols can benefit from it. It is flexible, allowing the adjustment of the puzzle difficulty, and includes a firewall proxy approach that would provide protection of the access network. This solution, however, requires modification to the network layers (IPv4, ICMP and IPv6).
Recent publications, such as i3 [17] and Hi3 [18] , which relate to architectural discussions about the future (mobile) Internet have also focused on denial of service protection. Many of these proposals require a signaling protocol to interact with rendezvous servers and end hosts before actual data traffic can be exchanged. These proposals, however, require substantial change in the network infrastructure, and cannot be used immediately (or not even after a long amount of time due to the massive infrastructural changes required). Furthermore, although some of these schemes are cryptographically secure, they cannot prevent against denial of service attacks described above.
As explained in Section 1, our primary focus in this paper is to protect TCP traffic. When we consider TCP connection set up requests, the most common threat is the TCP SYN flooding attack [4] where the attacker sends a constant stream of SYN requests but does not respond to the SYN-ACK segments that are sent back to the indicated source IP address of the IP packet carrying the TCP SYN segment. Several extensions to TCP have actually been proposed to reduce this threat, and could be re-used. The extensions include the TCP cookies [19] and the TCP cache [20] . However, these solutions require that the packets reach the end host as indicated in the destination IP address. As such, packets still traverse the air interface even though they might be dropped at the end host. These methods, therefore, do not solve the above-described problems.
The SYN Relay method shown in Fig. 1 could partly solve the problem since when using it: "the firewall will respond to all SYN packets on behalf of the server by sending the SYN/ACK to the client. Once the ACK is received from the client, the firewall passes the connection to the server. With this method, the server never receives invalid connection attempts because the firewall will not pass on the original SYN packet until it has received the corresponding ACK from the client" [21] . This method offers good protection for the server that includes protection of the air interface. However, the firewall needs to act as a relay between the server and the client. This breaks the end-to-end property of the connection since the TCP connection from the client terminates at the firewall, which recreates another TCP connection to the server. The TCP connection is split into two different connections: one from the client to the firewall, and one from the firewall to the server. The SYN Relay method implies a significant overhead at the firewall, and this solution is therefore typically only used when the network is under an active attack (e.g., the number of attack attempts has exceeded a threshold).
SERVER FRIENDLY FIREWALLS (SFF)
To address the problems described in previous sections, we have developed the server friendly firewall (SFF) that aims to reduce the unwanted IP traffic by blocking TCP SYN requests from forged source IP address. Before the TCP SYN packet is forwarded to the mobile device, the firewall uses a malformed SYN-ACK packet or a data packet to elicit an RST from the client and to indirectly verify the reachability of the client. This allows the firewall to verify that the TCP SYN request was not sent from an invalid source.
SYN Cookies and their Limitations
TCP servers use the SYN Cookie [19] mechanism to protect against CPU and memory exhaustion attacks. The offered security protection is a "return routability" check and delayed state establishment. The return routability check ensures that a TCP client transmitting a TCP SYN segment set is indeed reachable at the source IP address provided in the IP header. Note that we use the term TCP SYN segment throughout the document to indicate a TCP segment that has the SYN flag set. The same notation is used for other flags in the TCP header. As shown in Fig. 2 , a TCP connection takes place using the exchange of TCP SYN, SYN-ACK and ACK segment [22] . In the SYN segment, the TCP client selects a random sequence number X and expects the server to respond with it's own sequence number and an acknowledgement number X + 1. A conforming TCP sender follows this protocol, and responds with an appropriate SYN-ACK segment. On receiving the SYN-ACK the client first verifies that the ack seq of the segment is X + 1. If it is, then the client acknowledges the SYN-ACK segment by sending an ACK segment back (see Fig. 2 ). If the ack seq received by client is not X + 1, then the client sends an RST message back to server. Furthermore, if the client receives a data packet while waiting for a SYN-ACK it responds with a RST segment.
In the SYN cookie approach, the server does not allocate state (namely the Transmission Control Block (TCB)) until it has received the ACK segment in response to the SYN-ACK segment. Since the server does not know if the SYN arrived from a real or a malicious node, it waits until receiving the ACK corresponding to the SYN-ACK before allocating memory. Since the ACK segment can only be generated by the client that received the SYN-ACK (or a node on the data path between the client and the server), it guarantees that blind SYN flooding attacks (i.e., attacks mounted by off-path adversaries) will not impact the TCP server. Although SYN cookies work well against memory exhaustion, they cannot protect against battery power draining, over-billing, or bandwidth exhaustion attacks. To protect against these attacks, the mobile server must be protected before the attacker's packets traverse the air interface. One way to do this is to use network firewalls.
Stateful Server Friendly Firewall Design
For a firewall to protect the TCP server at the wireless end host, it must verify that the client that sent the request does indeed exist. However, unlike the wired case where the TCP server sends a SYN cookie, the firewall cannot send a SYN cookie since it does not know what sequence number the TCP server will use. Rather than acknowledging the SYN segment with the correct sequence number X + 1, the firewall sends a SYN segment with an invalid sequence number (see Fig. 3 ). When the TCP client receives an invalid SYN-ACK, it responds with an RST segment instead of an ACK but does not close the pending connection. (Such a behavior is explicitly allowed by RFC 793 [22, Page 33, Figure  9 ] because a TCP server might receive an old SYN segment, which might have got delayed in the network. In order to recover from such delayed packet, RFC 793 requires that the TCP client send an RST segment so that the TCP server could move to the LISTEN state upon receiving the RST segment from the client.) Since only a valid client can generate this RST segment with the right sequence numbers, the RST guarantees that the client is the one that initiated the TCP SYN. Because the TCP server does not need to know about the RST segment and the wrong sequence number, the connection can proceed normally once the firewall has verified that the client is valid.
Please note that sending a SYN-ACK with an invalid sequence number only verifies that there is an active host that returned the RST: It does not verify that a TCP client is really waiting for a SYN-ACK on the right port numbers. In some cases, verifying that a real TCP client is waiting for a port number might not be necessary if the attacker spoofed the IP address of an invalid client. In order to address this, a firewall may send a simple data packet without the SYN flag. As explained in RFC 793, such packets only generate an RST if the client is waiting in the SYN SENT state or if there is already a valid ongoing connection 2 . In the rest of the paper we assume the simple mode of operation with 2 An implementation should be careful not to include any As shown in Fig. 3 , the firewall sends a SYN-ACK or data packet after receiving the SYN segment. Instead of incrementing the sequence number by 1 and sending a valid SYN-ACK with ack seq = 10 + 1 = 11, it sends a wrong ack seq number. Since the client was expecting an ack seq number of 11, but receives an ack seq number of 8, it responds with an RST message whose sequence number is 8 [22, page 36] . When the firewall receives this RST, it verifies that the sequence number in RST is actually 8. If the verification is successful the firewall recreates the SYN and sends it to the server. From that point onwards, the connection can proceed normally.
Stateless Server Friendly Firewall Design
One potential problem with the scheme proposed in 3.2 is that the firewall needs to keep a minimum of 20 bytes (e.g., 8 bytes of two IP-headers, 4 bytes of TCP ports, 8 bytes of seq and wrong ack seq) for each SYN request in order to verify the incoming RST packet and reconstruct a valid SYN packet. In case of massive SYN flooding attacks, an attacker can target the firewall itself and cause memory exhaustion at the firewall. Fig. 4 shows the stateless approach in which the firewall does not need to keep any state until the client responds with a valid RST message. To achieve this, the firewall uses a secret key, SK, which is only known to the firewall itself. When the firewall receives the SYN request, it sends two segments.
First, a SYN-ACK (or a data) segment whereby the ack seq number of the packet is computed as shown in equation 1.
where make32(·) function takes the output of the hash function as input and converts it into a 32 bit number and | denotes concatenation of different input fields represented in 8-bit octets. When the client receives this SYN-ACK segment, it responds with a RST segment whose sequence number is the same as the ack seq number. When the firewall receives this RST segment, it should verify whether the sequence number data in the packet (e.g., it must set doff=tcp header size) to prevent blind data injection attacks using SFFs. Second, to obtain the correct sequence number the sender sends another TCP segment (without the SYN for ACK flags set) whose sequence number is same as the sequence number of the incoming SYN segment together with the first SYN-ACK packet. As pointed out in RFC 793, a TCP client on receiving a pure data packet should send an RST segment whose sequence number is same as the sequence number of the incoming segment (if no data is exchanged). Sending the data packet achieves the echo back effect. A firewall, after authorization, uses the sequence number from the echoed back RST message to construct the SYN segment to the server.
To summarize, the firewall sends two segments one with the cookie to authenticate the validity of the client, and a second one to reconstruct the SYN packet for the client. Fig. 4 depicts the details of the protocol interaction.
Note that if the second RST message is lost then the TCP client will retransmit the original SYN TCP segment. If the connection was authorized using the first SYN-ACK using make32 sequence number, then the new SYN packet will go through. To minimize sending multiple packets (two packets are sent for each received SYN), which could be used for reflection attacks [23] , a firewall should only switch to the stateless approach when the number of the pending TCP connections rises above a threshold. In many cases, the threshold could be dynamically adjusted.
Protocol Details
The firewall performs following steps to implement SFF:
Step-1: When the firewall receives the SYN segment, it extracts the seq field, and stores it in a local variable client seq = seq. The firewall stores the original SYN segment for further use.
Step-2: In case of the stateful method, the firewall gener-ates a 16 bit random number R, and constructs a TCP SYN-ACK segment with the source IP address of the TCP server, the destination IP address of the TCP client and the respective port numbers, but sets the ack seq field in the TCP segment to ack seq = seq−R. In addition to the TCP segment stored in the Step-1, the firewall also stores this ack seq number so that it can verify in the incoming RST segment.
In case of the stateless method, the firewall should send one TCP SYN-ACK segment and an additional TCP segment. The ack seq number of the SYN-ACK segment should be generated as described in equation 1.
The sequence number of the data segment should be the same as the sequence number of the incoming SYN segment.
Step-3: If the firewall does not receive a RST segment, or if it receives a RST segment whose seq number is not equal to ack seq in step-2, then it removes the TCP state from the firewall. Note that as pointed out RFC 793, a valid TCP client with TCP connection state will respond by sending a RST whose seq number will be the same as the ack seq number of SYN-ACK segment. Because the ack seq was generated randomly, an off-path adversary cannot predict the correct seq number in the RST segment. Also note that the TCP client will not close its connection because of the wrong sequence number in SYN-ACK (see [22] for detailed discussion). If the RST is valid, the firewall should mark that TCP connection as authenticated, and send a SYN segment to the server. Beyond that point, the connection will proceed normally.
With the stateless method, the firewall should authorize the connection based on the sequence number received in the RST segment, e.g., if the firewall receives a RST segment sequence number is same as described in equation 1. Unless the connection is authorized, the firewall should not forward any TCP segments to the server. After receiving a RST segment, verifying the sequence number and authorizing the connection, the firewall should construct a TCP SYN segment with the sequence number obtained from the RST message and send it to the TCP server. If the firewall does not receive the RST message but instead a SYN segment (because of a timeout at the client and a subsequent retransmission), the firewall should let the SYN segment to path the firewall towards the server.
The stateless method trades memory consumption at the firewall against delays during the connection establishment between the client and the server.
IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS
We have implemented the stateful scheme described in Section 3.2 using a proprietary software called netmon on Linux. netmon uses the packet capture library libpcap to intercept all incoming packets and processes them at application layer. We used the Komodia 3 PacketCrafter tool to generate the attack traffic, and verified that the TCP connection proceeds normally. The remaining paragraphs of this section give recommendations for a generic Server 3 http://www.komodia.com/tools.htm Friendly Firewall (SFF) implementation based on the experience gained with the netmon design and prototyping work.
Implementing the algorithms described in Section 3.4 requires minimal changes to existing firewalls. Most client firewalls already have facilities to keep states for TCP connections. In order to modify these firewalls to also accommodate for servers located behind the firewall, the firewall should keep two separate data structures called unauth req and auth req 4 for authorization. The unauth req data structure stores the IP address, the TCP port numbers, and the sequence number of the an incoming SYN segment. In addition, the unauth req data structure may optionally be designed to keep the TCP options for the incoming TCP SYN packets. The firewall should only keep the TCP options in the unauth req data structure if the memory consumed by unauthenticated SYN requests is small. Given the limitations of the TCP header and option size, under no circumstance, the unauth req data structure will exceed 92 bytes (assuming no IP options). The auth req data structure keeps all the filter rules that will allow an authorized TCP connection to go through. Since auth req data structure keeps connection information for an authorized TCP connection, there is no memory limitation on how this data structure is allocated and managed. We do not further discuss this aspect.
When a SYN packet arrives to the firewall, a unauth req data structure is allocated with the respective fields present in the SYN packet. In order to prevent the firewall itself from the DoS attack, it should closely monitor the amount of memory used up by the entire unauth req data structure pool. If the memory used exceeds a given threshold, the firewall should switch to stateless mode (in which case no memory is allocated until the connection is authorized).
Finally, associated with each unauth req data structure is a timer that removes unauth req data structure from the firewall, if no valid RST segment is received. Note that unauth req should not be immediately removed if the RST segment does not match, since an attacker could send fake RST messages to launch another form of DoS attacks. Since packets in the Internet are not expected to stay in the Internet for more than the Maximum Segment Lifetime (MSL) [22] , we recommend that the unauth req timer should not exceed 2 × M SL. In many cases, it might be useful to keep the timer value much smaller.
Since the firewall needs to clean the state for SYN connections based on timer expiry and based on incoming RST messages, it is important to have a data structure that can handle both these requirements in an efficient manner. An easy way to achieve this is to keep two hash tables: one which is hashed based on IP address and port numbers, while the other one based on the time interval within which the states need to be freed.
Any challenge-response protocol can be abused to perform a reflection attack [23] . In case of stateless SFF, the problem is aggravated because the firewall needs to send two segments in case of the stateless version. While the amount of data sent during this exchange is small (equivalent to sending two TCP header segments), it is important that SFFs enable the stateless mode of operation with considerable care.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a method to reduce the TCP SYN attacks from unverified sources. The mechanism can effectively protect the access link and the endpoint. It is especially valuable in cellular and wireless networks where the air interface is costly, and the endpoints have limited capabilities. The suggested approach does not aim to provide protection against DDoS attacks initiated by botnets.
We introduced two variations of the SFF method: a stateful and a stateless approach. These two approaches trade memory consumption at the firewall against connection set up delay. Fortunately, the stateful and the stateless approaches are complementary: The stateful approach can be used in an initial phase when the TCP connections attempts are low, and the stateless approach can be applied when the number of TCP connection setup attempts exceed a certain threshold. The proposed method preserves the end-to-end nature of TCP and does not require any modifications to existing protocols (e.g., TCP, IP). It does not require the client or the server to be upgraded either. Minor changes are needed only at firewalls. The solution can therefore be deployed immediately.
However, the scheme introduces delay to the connection setup by one round trip, the round trip taken to verify that the client can generate a valid RST message. Also, some firewalls implement a feature, typically called "Sequence Verifier", that watches all traffic flows going through the firewall and keeps track of the sequence numbers in the packets. Packets with incorrect sequence number are considered out of state and dropped by the firewall. If the client is in a network protected by firewall(s) implementing the Sequence Verifier functionality, the proposed method may not be applicable since the SYN-ACK sent by the firewall protecting the server (as suggested in this paper) may be dropped by the firewall protecting the client. It, however, has to be noted that the Sequence Verifier feature can usually be turned off by the network administrators. For example, it is not activated in certain configurations such as firewall clusters using asymmetric routing.
Since standardization fora are currently specifying different firewall signaling protocols (e.g., NSIS NATFW/FW NSLP [24] ), it is possible to extend these protocols to allow the client to learn the features implemented in the firewall (e.g., TCP Sequence Verifier, TCP SYN Relay, etc.) and allow the client, assuming it is properly authorized, to configure the firewall (e.g., enable/disable certain features).
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